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Complicated relations in modern society cannot be regulated by law unless they are separated into 
several intrinsic layers. If we drop the textual approach to law, then we can have an unbiased 
view of the system of concept categories of each branch of law under the layer of the text 
appearing on the surface which constitutes the dogmatic layer of law; in addition to these, judicial 
case law - high court precedents, judicial practices making the open usage of acts and orders more 
accurate – represents the third layer of law. (For more detailed description of this multi-layer 
concept of law see Pokol:2000). The relations of these three layers of law, their proportions to 
each other are different in each law system, but to a certain extent all three have been present in 
modern legal systems of this last century. The appearance of constitutional jurisdiction, which 
subsequent to 19
th
 century beginnings in America has spread in several European countries since 
the end of the 1940‟s and become a routine procedure after the changes in 1989 in Central and 
Eastern European countries, is a new product of development. Compared to dogmatically 
chiselled traditional administration of justice made more accurate by judicial case law, this new 
layer of law, which originally appeared in the form of human rights as the collection of 
ideological/political requirements outside legal systems in operation, is characterised by highly 
different features. One such difference is that the normative content of constitutional rights and 
freedoms and fundamental principles is more abstract than the rules of traditional fields of law. 
The other difference is due to the fact that relations between particular rights are mostly 
irreconcilably strained, and a certain right can be enforced only at the expense of another right or 
principle. These features did not cause any problems while people had to fight with them as ideal 
requirements, setting human rights against actual conditions, for the transformation of prevalent 
conditions. Judicial decisions based on them as constitutional rights and freedoms used for being 
applied in cases, however, often lead to legal uncertainty. 
 
(Three dimensions of constitutionalization) This particular problem of the layer of 
constitutional rights and freedoms has not been serious for predictable administration of justice 
even while its effect has been exerted on the legislator and other lawmakers. This has represented 
the prime rule during the recent half century in the countries where the institution of 
constitutional jurisdiction has appeared. Constitutional rights and freedoms and fundamental 
principles have guided the alternative choice of the legislator and pushed the content of 
provisions of law in drafting acts and orders in the direction where the abstract instructions of 
fundamental rights and principles appear in them more properly. At this point, it is at most the 
question of democracy that is raised by the too wide power of judicial review exercised by the 
constitutional court. For the expression of the empirical will of the people in parliament 
formulated by the voting of millions is forced to the background on the grounds of the decision of 
a few constitutional court justices. In spite of the problem of democracy fundamental rights, 
which include overall aspects of justness, can reduce the amplitudes of the empirical will of the 
people based on short term and rather emotional moods of the masses. Making a somewhat 
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aristocratic remark, it can be said that „the radically subversive‟ element built into mobocracy can 
be tamed by the constitutional court justices, who deliberate and make decisions in adherence to 
the standards of upper classes. Problems actually arise if this decision-making forum gets 
permanently and globally in conflict with legislature based on the empirical will of the people and 
the authoritative political elite. 
 
It constitutes a new dimension when constitutional rights and freedoms go beyond determining 
the legislation and begin to exert directly determining pressure towards the micro-processes of 
law and judicial decisions in cases as well. In addition to these two dimensions, 
constitutionalization may touch jurisprudence and dogmatic activity: by connecting internal 
issues of various branches of law and dogmatic constructions of law to constitutional rights and 
fundamental principles; and by describing the dogmatic system of various branches of law more 
or less as being deduced from fundamental rights. Subsequently, a specific branch of law will 
appear as „a constitutional branch of law‟ – „constitutional criminal law‟, „constitutional taxation 
law‟, „constitutional labour law‟, etc. – and once this has been accepted by the lawyers in the 
given branch, then, in addition to law politics criticism alongside lawmaking, „the constitutional 
rights of the branch of law‟ will be considered as the basis of interpretation of the rules of that 
branch by legislators as well. The constitutionalized jurisprudence of various branches of law 
may thus move in two, different directions: towards legislation they may appear as a new law 
politics assessment system, now condemning current legal conditions for lagging behind 
constitutionalized fundamental rights, and towards law enforcement as the supporters of judicial 
law enforcement with a new viewpoint driving law interpretation towards the constitutional rights 
under branches of law. 
 
Out of the three dimensions of constitutionalization, only with respect to the constitutionalization 
of judicial proceedings is my intention in this study to examine the operation of the layer of 
fundamental rights, and to expound the problems that arise in this field. After that, in the final 
part of the study I shall describe the phenomenon of „political fighting through litigation‟, which 
arise from these developments. By breaking elements up into three dimensions it is possible to 
assess the effect exerted by the layer of constitutional rights and freedoms on each layer of the 
legal system more accurately than by describing the constitutionalization of the entire legal 
system without any differentiation made. Thus, for example, at the comparative law conference 
arranged in 1998 in Bristol the papers prepared on this subject focused on „the 
constitutionalization of the legal order‟ in summary, while they commented the current state of 
constitutional court‟s judicial review of the legislation in various countries (see Koch 1998; 
Poplawska 1998). The subtle treatment of the subject allows that the effects of 
constitutionalization can be assessed in each dimension separately, and that the negative or 
positive assessment of one dimension should not influence the assessment made in the other 
dimension. 
 
1 Two aspects of the constitutionalization of judicial proceedings 
 
If the layer of fundamental rights go beyond the judicial review of legislation and begin to 
influence judicial decisions in cases, then the influence can be examined from two different 
aspects. Firstly, regarding that the judge can decide the case by taking into consideration, in 
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addition to the relevant legal rules, constitutional rights and freedoms. That is, in this event, 
constitutional rights and freedoms exert their effect on the judicial decision not only through 
drafting laws to be enforced by the judge but in addition to/instead of that they directly appear in 
the formation of decisions. Secondly, regarding that it exerts an effect towards the 
constitutionalization of the legal order when participation in the litigation is disconnected from 
the state of being personally concerned and more comprehensive groups, associations can enter 
the judicial proceedings for whom it is not the specific subject of the litigation that counts but the 
possibility to fight for a definite outcome of the litigation using it as means of shaping an overall 
issue. Let us look at these two aspects of constitutionalization, possibly called the substantive law 
and procedural law side of this process respectively, and the questions related them in more 
detail. 
 
1.1 The substantive law aspect of constitutionalization 
 
While in most of the countries where the institution of constitutional jurisdiction has been 
established, it has been confined to the judicial review of legislation, subsequently constitutional 
rights and freedoms and fundamental principles have not been granted a direct role in the micro-
processes of law; in Germany and the United States since the mid 1950‟s attempts have been 
made in this direction. In Germany this problem area has been called „the horizontal‟ effect of 
fundamental rights or, looking at it from another aspect, „the tertiary direction effect‟ 
(Dritwirkung); in the United Sates since the 1960‟s when the theoretical treatment of the issues 
concerning new legal developments commenced, studies on the subject have been prepared under 
the headword: „the constitutionalization‟ of solving problems in the administration of justice and 
society. The problems arising here are grasped in different width by the two thematic 
interpretations, and the wider, American thematic interpretation has corresponded to the actual 
situation that the constitutionalization of law enforcement has been performed on a wider scale 
and touching the operation of law more profoundly in the U.S. than in Germany. 
 
In Germany the Constitution declares fundamental rights to be directly enforceable rights, and 
since the 1950‟s during the course of making judicial decisions the question has arisen what role 
constitutional rights and freedoms that seem relevant in the given case may have alongside 
applicable legal provisions (Alexy 1985). Logically, in this respect, three positions are possible. 
The first can be that the judge shall not take fundamental rights into consideration because the 
legislator has already been controlled and determined either by them or the constitutional court 
decisions interpreting them. In this direction the role of fundamental rights is somewhat stronger 
when the judge needs to take into consideration the guiding of the relevant fundamental rights 
and constitutional court decisions basically in formulating his decisions tied to the relevant 
provisions of law, but also in his interpretation work because of the openness of the provisions of 
law, and needs to implement his deliberation in view of these. Finally, fundamental rights will 
attain the strongest position in the forming of the judge‟s decision when the judge can (and shall) 
both refer to fundamental rights in the interpretation and strike the applicable provisions of law 
down and base his decision entirely on constitutional provisions. 
 
These three positions emerged in German law literature from the beginning of the 1950‟s in the 
analysis of the possible effects exerted by constitutional rights and freedoms towards direct 
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judicial decision; and the problem was called „the horizontal effect‟ of fundamental rights in view 
of the fact that fundamental rights had originally protected the individual „in vertical direction‟ 
against the state and the overall community. And now their effect in the interrelations, i.e. in the 
horizontal relations, between citizens was put into focus. The German Federal Constitutional 
Court thoroughly considered its decision made on the issue, and after the Federal Labour Court 
had ignored the provisions of labour law in a labour lawsuit and decided the case directly on the 
grounds of the Constitution, and a huge debate evolved in the literature on the consequences of 
this revolution in law enforcement, the Constitutional Court took the position that fundamental 
rights might exert only indirect effect on judicial decision, and judicial decision might be based 
on them only to the extent of analysing the openness of the provisions of law, but laws should not 
be ignored. If a judge deems that a particular provision of law is in conflict with one of the 
constitutional rights and freedoms, then he can suspend his proceedings, and may appeal to the 
Constitutional Court requesting the examination of that particular provision of law. He himself, 
however, shall not ignore it. 
 
Germans have been left alone with even this middle-of-the-road position of theirs because 
Austrians and Italians, who have had constitutional jurisdiction since as early as the 1950‟s, 
having examined the matter have decided that they do not approve of the horizontal role of 
fundamental rights even to such an extent. Also, in Germany, in spite of the declarative 
recognition, the inclusion of constitutional rights and freedoms into judicial decisions has 
remained moderate even in such an indirect function. 
 
Constitutionalization has been performed on a much wider scale in the United Sates, and it has 
exerted a much broader effect on both the operations of the legal order and political life. 
Subsequently, since the 1970‟s a new tendency has begun to replace the old one, first by stopping 
further constitutionalization, then by a resolute reversal from the beginning of the 1990‟s (see 
Epp 1998). 
 
In the United States the constitutionalization of judicial proceedings was greatly connected to the 
different dominance of political forces on member state and federal level and the opposition of 
the two levels for that very reason, which eventually resulted in the Civil War in the 1860‟s. The 
federal government, the federal legislature and the separate federal court system established on it 
traditionally constituted the depositories of the central formation of will in the United States just 
becoming uniform against member state laws and member state authorities; and the continuous 
extension of federal competencies during the recent one hundred years has been accomplished by 
the more and more broadening interpretation of the Constitution by the federal courts, and by the 
Federal Supreme Court, in the first place. One aspect of this has been (in addition to the widening 
legislative power of the federal Congress to the account of member state legislatures) the 
inclusion of constitutional provisions pertaining to federal issues into judicial law enforcement, 
and through that the striking down of member state laws (and member state courts ordered to 
enforce them). To make this understandable it might be worth referring to the legal case from the 
beginning of the 1980‟s when a college in the U.S. entered a two-year contract with a PE teacher, 
but gave him notice after a year. The PE teacher intended to argue with the lawfulness of the 
notice not in compliance with labour rules, which would have fallen under the jurisdiction of the 
member state court, but by interpreting the loss of his salary as loss of property and basing his 
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claim on the provision of the Constitution that sets forth that “no person shall be deprived of 
property without due process of law”. This basis of litigation transferred the case into the 
competence of the federal court, and if the judges were inclined to interpret property in such 
terms, then a considerable part of labour cases would be executed as an action of infringement of 
a constitutional right and redress thereof. This case, however, happened to be allocated to Richard 
Postner, Chief Justice of the Chicago Federal Court of Appeal, who being an opponent of 
constitutionalization rejected the claim, and indicated to the PE teacher that in a member state 
court judgment would be made pursuant to labour rules probably in his favour (see Cohen 
1985:1117-1118). What counts here is that litigation is doubled by creating the option of 
constitutionalized litigation, and the plaintiff has the option of either prosecuting a constitutional 
lawsuit or trying to solve his or her problem pursuant to simple laws. 
 
This tendency reached its peak by the mid 1970‟s and in federal courts a parallel 
„constitutionalized‟ administration of justice evolved in addition to traditional techniques of 
litigation. The opposition evolving among lawyers and in courts made public opinion and politics 
aware of the emerging problems, and especially the law politicians of the Republican political 
side began to claim, more and more dramatically, the necessity of turning this process back. 
President Reagan put the issue in his election program at the beginning of the 1980‟s asserting 
that in the event that he was elected President, he would attempt to appoint federal justices who 
are against „the constitutionalization‟ of judicial decisions. After he had been elected, his 
administration of justice managed to break through in the 1980‟s and once the federal judiciary 
had been replaced, constitutionalization ceased to be pursued in judicial proceedings to such a 
great extent. Eventually, through filling vacancies with the nine justices coming in turn in the 
federal supreme judicial forum by the beginning of the 1990‟s, it was possible to turn the majority 
of justices towards stopping constitutionalization. Against the line of „constitutionalization‟ that 
began in 1953 with Chief Justice Earl Warren, and continued with Hugo Black, then with 
William J. Brennan, William O. Douglas, Abe Fortas, the camp for reversing the process was 
represented by Felix Frankfurter, John M. Harlan, William H. Rehnquist, Sandra Day‟O Cooner, 
Antonin Scalia, who fought a hopeless struggle with them in the beginning, and who have 
constituted the majority of the supreme judicial forum in America in recent years. Among law 
scholars Ronald Dworkins has to be considered the arch supporter of the constitutionalization 
trend, while it was Alexander M. Bickel who began to fight to cut it back in the 1960‟s, then 
since the 1970‟s Robert Bork and since the 1980‟s Antonin Scalia have written important works 
to carry on with the issue. (Eventually Scalia was appointed the associate justice of the Federal 
Supreme Court in the middle of the 1980‟s, but Robert Bork‟s nomination failed because of the 
political and media strength of the opponents who acted uniformly.) 
 
Compared to the German „horizontal effect‟, the constitutionalization of law enforcement in the 
United States was thus accomplished with a more penetrating force for a while. Constitutional 
rights and freedoms and supreme court decisions interpreting them in the U.S. are made part of 
law interpretation just like in Germany, but through the independent course of constitutional 
litigation it is also possible to strike down laws the way referred to above. A broad interpretation 
of constitutional rights and freedoms, and the deduction of numerous normative points of 
reference from constitutional fundamental principles, are instrumental in completely striking 
down simple laws and the law dogmatic constructions behind them; and judicial decisions in 
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cases can be made on the grounds of constitutional rights and the points of reference applied in 
the literature of rights that elaborate on them, instead of provisions of law made more accurate by 
law dogmatics. (with regard to family law in the U.S. see Schneider 1988:79-121). In terms of 
legal techniques it might not be out of the question that a new kind of predictability will evolve 
after a longer period, although because of the multitudes of necessary changes it is unforeseeable 
in what way this could happen, if it is possible at all; nevertheless, after a twenty years period of 
this trend the mainstream of American law has shifted towards reversing it. 
 
1.2 The procedural law aspect of constitutionalization 
 
In the United States, alongside the substantive law aspect of constitutionalization, from the 
1960‟s developments on the procedural side began to shift traditional administration of justice to 
the domain of constitutional law/public law for a while. The core of this was that individual 
litigation was replaced by mass action, which extremely enhanced the importance of judicial 
proceedings in view of conducting the struggles of wider groups of society. And the execution of 
mass action pursuant to constitutional rights and freedoms actually created the alternative for 
groups of society of either organising themselves into parties and attempting to attain their goals 
in the legislation through modifying laws, or fighting for them through judicial proceedings thus 
changed. 
 
Traditional litigation was shifted into this direction along two, intertwined tracks of development 
from the beginning of the 1960‟s. One of them represented the evolution of „public interest 
litigation‟ or „public law litigation‟, and the other that of „class action‟. 
 
(Public law litigation) Entering a traditional, civil action, or joining an ongoing action is possible 
only by a person whose interest protected by law is directly affected by the case in such action. 
The outcome of a massive court action often affects the status of other people in similar situation, 
especially when judicial precedent law plays a powerful role in the legal system of the given 
country. In this event, in any subsequent litigation this decision will be taken into consideration as 
precedent on behalf of the persons in similar situation; subsequently, for the persons who are in a 
situation similar to the individual litigant the outcome of the action is important. It apparently 
goes back to the fact that in the United Sates attempts have been made by outside parties to join 
judicial proceedings since the end of the last century. The first form of this effort was the „amicus 
curiae brief‟ (see Kristlov 1963). This consisted of the description of a lawyer‟s position written 
by some respectable lawyer or law professor in order „to help‟ to decide the given case. These 
letters expounded arguments, regulations applied in other countries which urged the judges who 
decided the case to proceed into a given direction. This activity is usually pursued by respectable 
lawyers, government officials, experts of large companies prior to superior court decisions of 
general importance, when the outcome of the case is meaningful for them. 
 
One version of the amicus curiae brief is the so-called Brandeis-brief, which expounds legal 
arguments and changes in social facts for the judges who decide cases, and attempts to attain 
secession from previous relevant precedents. Louis Brandeis, who later became the member of 
the supreme judicial forum, wrote his example setting letter in an important case in 1908, which, 
after a two page traditional legal argument, outlined in a 110 page study social changes calling for 
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new decisions to be made by judges against old precedents. In the midst of the euphoria of 
transforming law into „sociological jurisprudence‟ that drew upon social sciences this kind of 
letter set a pattern for „social engineer‟ lawyers for long decades. 
 
This antecedent makes the evolution of public law litigation from the 1960‟s understandable. At 
that time a modification was made in the rules of court, which allowed that anyone whose interest 
should be affected by the outcome of an ongoing action might join such action, provided that the 
party in the action in similar situation should not be able to defend the given interest. The judge 
was obliged to permit the joining of the action; and another clause allowed that the interested 
party might join the action, even if the claimed interest was properly defended, when an overall 
fact or legal issue was concerned in the action. The judge, however, had the right of deliberation 
whether to permit the joining of the action (Vreeland 1990:279-310). Since this modification in 
the rules of court intervention has taken place in multitudes of lawsuits, and now judicial decision 
may be influenced not only from outside with an amicus curiae brief, or in the form of a 
Brandeis-brief by overall interest groups, associations but also by the parties involved in the 
lawsuit. 
 
In such event, however, the action will be essentially transformed, and the emphasis is shifted 
from an individual’s interest to win the action to the enforcement of an overall social group’s 
long term interest. Subsequently, the lawsuit is executed for the sake of winning a permanently 
better legal position with the participation of the unions of the relevant social group. This change 
in character will make the courtroom similar rather to the plenary session of a legislative body, 
with huge media publicity, and not the place where neutral lawyer‟s argumentation takes place. 
Litigation appears to be an alternative for political interest groups to attempting to fight for the 
modification of law as a lobby or a political party in parliament (see Chayes 1982). Choosing the 
option of political fighting through public law litigation is especially advantageous for ethnic 
groups or minorities because they can enforce their will with more difficulty in the majority 
legislature. A cutting back attempted in 1984 was justified by a preparatory subcommittee of 
Congress by stating that “The members of a particular race or sex can easily set up a group, given 
the inclination of the federal judges to acknowledge the litigation right of social groups defined in 
terms of sociology. Abstract rights and freedoms constitute a basis for such groups, which makes 
rights litigation similar rather to legislation than traditional lawsuit between class litigants” 
(quoted by Feinberg 1984:272). The golden age of public law litigation was in the 1960‟s but 
even in the period between 1986 and 1989 171 such cases can be found when examining actions 
executed in federal courts, in spite of the fact that by then the staff of federal judiciary had been 
mostly replaced, and justices considered the possibilities for joining lawsuits stricter when 
granting permission; and, consequently, the transformation of lawsuits into public law litigation 
was to a certain extent forced back. 
 
When analysing the American impact in this respect on Western European countries, it can be 
seen that the appearance of public law litigation has taken place only partially. Because here it 
usually falls within the public prosecutor‟s competence to join a lawsuit if the interest of the 
litigant is not properly represented and bears an overall social significance (for a comparative 
analysis of this see: Feldman 1992). In spite of this, certain developments have already begun 
with a view to attaining that the law of the European Union shall be enforced through judicial 
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proceedings against reluctant domestic laws by applying to the European Court of Justice 
regarding specific cases if the relevant social group has not been able to enforce it because of the 
resistance of domestic legislature (see Feldman 1992). In the form of a germ it is the same as 
what has resulted in „the constitutionalization‟ of law enforcement in the fight between federal 
and member state political forces in the United Sates during the recent 40 years. In Europe quite 
often it is through the extension of the jurisdiction of the European Court of Justice based on the 
broadening interpretation of the Union‟s Treaty that member state legislatures are more strongly 
subject to the Union. Currently, however, on the level of the Union there is no fundamental rights 
charter (the European Court of Human Rights applies the European Human Rights Treaty 
regarding both the Union and each member state of the European Commission) and therefore „the 
pushing forward‟ of the formation of will in Brussels has not been able to proceed by applying 
fundamental rights in a wider sense. Thus, although the status of the relation between the 
European Union and its members states is similar in every respect to the situation in the U.S. at 
the end of the 19
th
 and the beginning of the 20
th
 century, and there this situation led to the 
(federal) constitutionalization of law enforcement, this cannot generate similar phenomena among 
the member states of the European Union. But if a fundamental rights charter with proper legal 
force were after all established in the European Union, and attempts are being made to attain this 
goal by some political groups, then the creation of the United States of Europe would be 
supposedly accelerated through that channel as well. 
 
With regard to public law litigation reference should be made also to the phenomenon of strategic 
litigation. This phenomenon evolves due to the existence of precedent law in the countries where 
precedent law plays a larger than usual role, and because of that in the United States public law 
litigation assumes the nature of strategic litigation. The point is that strong interest groups are 
interested not only in winning a particular case, they litigate not primarily to win a particular 
action but for the sake of enforcing a decision in a leading case in favour of them. One of the 
consequences of this is that if prospects in the particular lawsuit are unfavourable, then interest 
groups attempt in any way to come to a agreement with the opposing party, possibly by accepting 
worse conditions than the ones that they could after all obtain in the action, just to avoid that a 
sentence is made, so that no legal „trace‟ of the given case should remain. On the contrary, if 
conditions for winning are good, then under no circumstances are they willing to come to an 
agreement because the prime aim is to attain precedent in the given case (see 
Tushnet/Schneider/Kovner 1988:975). 
 
(Class action) This form has evolved primarily in mass claims for damages when due to a large 
company‟s responsibility for particular products or because of an environment polluting event 
crowds of several thousand or ten thousand people become affected. In this event those affected, 
forming a litigation group, enter the action as a quasi interest group so that the judge attain the 
payment of damages by fighting. But the spreading of „class action‟ has transferred this form of 
litigation to numerous other fields, and measures of public administration agencies, school 
authorities, etc. are often attacked in this form. And through this spreading, class action often gets 
fused with public law litigation (see Elhauge 1991:72-77). In this event, a single judicial decision 
decides the case of ten thousands of people; what is more there are tendencies that on condition 
that anyone shall prove that he or she shall „rank among the class‟, that is, shall be in a situation 
identical with the situation the parties involved in the action were in, a judicial certification may 
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be issued to such person regarding the judgment of his or her claim without the need of such 
person formally taking part in the action because it is apparent that the judge – as any lawmaker – 
decides the case of huge social masses, and not the case of a particular individual. 
 
2. Attempts made at constitutionalizing law enforcement in Hungary 
 
Right from the outset it should be noted that in Hungarian judicial law enforcement no major 
shifts have taken place in the direction of constitutionalization; nevertheless, recently there have 
been attempts that indicate the appearance of concepts with an impact in this direction. In the 
description of the state of affairs in Hungary the analysis of these attempts is again worth splitting 
into two parts, and after exploring the substantive law dimension of constitutionalization the 
realm of procedural law needs to be looked at separately. 
 
2.1 The substantive law aspect of constitutionalization. The first point that should be made in 
the analysis of the state of affairs in Hungary is that the Constitutional Court created in 1989 by 
the change of regime was vested with an enormous power to review legislation, and the tribunal 
itself further augmented this power, but did not push forward to review judicial proceedings and 
decisions. (In adherence to the model evolved in Western Europe, in Hungary the Constitutional 
Court is operated as a separately organised body and it is not the Supreme Judicial Court that 
undertakes this task.) Nor did the provisions of the Constitution allow this pushing forward, but – 
because in another respect it did not cause any problem for the judges of the Constitutional Court 
when extending their competence – it was much more important that feeling the tension generated 
by their expansive action against the legislature the judges of the Constitutional Court decided 
themselves in 1991, in the initial period of their operation, that they did not intend to compete 
with the law interpretation activity of the Supreme Court covering the entire judicial system (see 
the Constitutional Court Resolution of 57/1991). 
 
A new attempt to create the path for the Constitutional Court‟s judicial review of the resolutions 
made by the Supreme Court on the unity of law seems to have changed this position. (The 
resolutions on the unity of law made by the supreme judicial forum are binding pursuant to the 
Constitution on lower courts when later they deal with cases similar to these.) The problem here 
is that this would make the direct effect of constitutional rights and freedoms and fundamental 
principles on judicial law interpretation formally recognised. So far the judges of the 
Constitutional Court have been able to intervene only in the drafting of laws pertaining to judges, 
and thus constitutional rights and freedoms and fundamental principles have exerted their 
formative effect only in this domain. By this step a fundamental breakthrough would take place, 
and abstract rights and freedoms would be directly asserted in the realm of judicial proceedings 
and decisions as well. 
 
 
There is further cause for concern that should the path for constitutional court‟s direct judicial 
review of the resolutions on the unity of law be opened, then the halt prior to the decision made 
by the other, supreme judicial forum, also constituting judicial precedent law, will become simply 
unjustified. The path once opened for the constitutional law review of judicial law interpretation 
would be constrained to run through the entire high court case-law material. And if that happens, 
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then for lawyers it will become a primary task to search for help in the field of constitutional 
rights and freedoms and fundamental principles in addition to the provisions of law unfavourable 
for their clients. These are abstract and flexible enough to make any case that seems to be losing 
defensible. And courts, either at lower or medium level, shall not reject to transfer the action to 
the domain of the Constitution as it is done today with reference made to the Constitutional Court 
Resolution 75/1991. See the judicial decision BH 223. in 1998, for example. 
 
In summary, if the resolution on the unity of law were made subject to constitutional court‟s 
judicial review, then within a short time we would get through the necessary steps to the 
constitutionalization of law enforcement in the realm of substantive law, even if this would not be 
supported by the majority of constitutional court judges at all. And whether it would stay on 
“medium” level, as it was the case with the horizontal effect of fundamental rights in Germany 
described above, or would be transferred to the level of direct constitutional law litigation as 
happened in the federal jurisdiction in the U.S., cannot be predicted. This latter case has once 
occurred in Hungarian administration of justice when a local judicial court striking down the 
relevant provisions of legal rules decided an abortion case on the grounds of the Constitution. It 
was approvingly welcome by minor jurist circles but overall public opinion formed among 
lawyers and the judiciary reacted negatively to this case. 
 
It should be noted that in Central-Eastern Europe it is Poland where attempts have been made to 
constitutionalize law enforcement, and until 1997 the constitutional court there had the power of 
obligatory law interpretation vis-á-vis judicial courts. Law interpretation pursuant to abstract 
rights and freedoms always draws ideological/political aspects more intensively, and finally this 
led to open clash between the supreme judicial forum and the constitutional court judges. As a 
result of the clash the new Polish Constitution in 1997 voided the obligatory law interpretation 
power of constitutional court judges and their option to intervene in law enforcement. See 
Poplawska 1998:132-133). 
 
2.2 The procedural law aspect of constitutionalization. As it has been described in the analysis 
of the constitutionalization of American judicial proceedings, in this domain legal actions are 
made subject to public law and constitutionalized by overall social groups who join the action 
alongside private persons directly interested in and affected by the action. This shifts the emphasis 
from winning a particular action in the short run to indirect, long-term effects. That brings along 
both permanent legal effects (e.g., obtaining a high court precedent which may create legal basis 
for later claims for a wide range of people affected by the given issue) and the involvement of a 
broader, political public opinion in the procedure of the action. 
 
Looking at the activity of jurists, judges and lawmakers in Hungary, it can be immediately 
ascertained in summary that, contrary to the extensive presence of public law litigation and class 
actions intertwined with political implications in the U.S., these are not frequent in our country. 
The aforesaid abortion case, which has been the only example, even in terms of substantive law, 
of any attempt made at constitutionalization, appeared in the media and was considered by 
political public opinion as a place for clashing with advocates of contrary social views; and it 
involved the anti-abortion association and the data protection ombudsman, who referred to the 
protection of a constitutional right, as well as the law politicians of the small group of activist 
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lawyers who were fighting for an overall constitutionalization of the judicial proceedings. 
Furthermore, in some of the criminal procedures with ethnic implications it can be observed that 
the representatives of human rights activist organisations with noticeable media support, the 
Roma Parliament, the National Ethnic Minorities Legal Aid Office, e.g., take firm action to 
defend perpetrators of Gypsy origin, and approach the problems of the criminal procedure in the 
light of constitutional law instead of the criminal law and the rules of criminal code. This 
phenomenon, however, has not yet evolved in wider areas in domestic jurisdiction. 
 
Dissolving this summary statement and separating relevant legal frameworks, it can be said about 
the sociological institutional and practical background concerned in the issue that on the level of 
legal frameworks nothing would thwart the shifting of judicial proceedings towards public law. 
 
In civil actions in Hungary, pursuant to the European prime rule, public prosecutors also have an 
extensive right to enter an action and intervene in an action, although this right has been narrowed 
by the statutory modifications made after the changes in 1989; also, the Constitutional Court 
Resolution 1/1994 deemed that a part of public prosecutors‟ power to enter an action was anti-
constitutional. But even today public prosecutors apply to take legal proceedings quite freely 
when the obligee is unable to defend its rights (see clause (1) §.9 of the Civil Procedure (CP)). 
Also, numerous special rules of law empower public prosecutors to bring a lawsuit or take firm 
action in civil lawsuits already initiated (see pp. 36-47 of the explanation of CP), In addition to 
public prosecutors, social organisations are also authorised by law in certain areas to bring an 
action or intervene in a lawsuit. Thus, Clause (2), §.109 of Act LIII of 1995 shall empower 
citizens‟ environment protection organisations to take an action in general provided that they 
shall notice any activity that endanger the environment anywhere. Likewise, consumer protection 
social organisations shall be authorised under §.39 Act CLV of 1997 to do so in the event of any 
infringement of customers‟ rights (see pp. 40-41 of the explanation of the CP). 
 
Also, wide legal frameworks for civil actions to attain the function of public law/political actions 
are created under §.54-57 of the CP, which regulate intervention in a lawsuit. It can be said that 
they allow intervention into an action on a much wider scale than the above outlined American 
solutions because there interested parties may intervene on condition that the interest in the action 
is not properly represented. The Hungarian regulation, on the contrary, does not make the rule 
subject to this restriction, and “anyone who is legally interested in what the outcome of the action 
in progress between other persons will be, may, prior to the trial preceding the passing of a 
judgment by a court of first instance has been adjourned, intervene in order to facilitate the 
winning of such action by the party with identical interest" (CP Clause (1) §. 54.). And, the points 
what the legal interest shall be and how directly one shall be concerned is left by the vague 
phrasing to be determined by the prevailing judicial practice. In the United States in the 1960-
70‟s, e.g., when general political opinion greatly supported the implementation of social changes 
through law, judges were willing to approve any citizen‟s compliance with the condition of being 
legally concerned asserting that as a taxpayer any citizen should be concerned in some way in any 
legal case with broader impact (see Chayes 1982). In the judicial practice in Hungary the interest 
by which one is entitled to intervene is interpreted in a restrictive sense; and this regulation has 
remained problem free primarily because Hungarian civil organisations have not entered in their 
repertoire the attainment of their goals through lawsuits. 
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Furthermore, for assigning public law function to civil actions the institution of „joinder‟ set forth 
under Hungarian regulation, provided for under §. 51 of the CP, is also at hand. It is in every 
respect basically identical with the American institution of class action, and a possible change in 
the strategy of domestic civil organisations can make it a suitable means of pushing actions into 
the direction of public law as it happened in the United Sates in the 1960-70‟s. Clause (c) of the 
aforesaid Section, e.g., allows the option of applying the institution of joinder, i.e., joint action, in 
a broad sense provided that “the claims in the action arise from similar content and legal base”. 
 
The joining of criminal actions by wider social groups, possibly associations, is allowed by the 
fact that §.57 of the Criminal Code secures participation in the action for “other interested 
parties”. This innocent power under procedural law will, of course, exert a genuine overall effect 
when other interested parties who appear in criminal proceedings, or, possibly the association (or 
the representatives thereof) of a wider circle of the interested parties, base their claims on 
constitutional rights and freedoms instead of the procedural law and criminal substantive law, and 
thus change the function of the lawsuit. The same applies, as a matter of course, to joining civil 
actions. Such actions assume public law function also by their substantive law basis being shifted 
towards constitutional rights and fundamental principles and constitutional court decisions made 
on them alongside the procedural aspect of mass action. The joint effect exerted by the two 
domains will actually transform the traditional judicial proceedings. 
 
Thus, in Hungary legal frameworks are available in the domain of procedural law for the 
constitutionalization of law enforcement; and, in addition to the confining effect exerted by the 
European law culture, it has been actually the lack of a strategy in this respect of domestic civil 
organisations that has fortunately safeguarded domestic law enforcement from being shifted 
towards constitutionalization. It seems, however, that the intense responsiveness of dominant 
groups in the sphere of intellectuals and the media to the intellectual influence of American 
intelligent circles, makes this kind of shift more probable in our country than it has been possible 
in the Western European countries in the recent decades. 
 
 
3. Political fighting through litigation 
 
In European legal systems continuous political fighting and the competition between various 
decision alternatives, which have evolved after the attainment of political democratisation (thus, 
in the Western parts of the Continent since the second half of the 19
th
 century, and in the Eastern 
parts, in their recreated form, since the political changes in 1989), are organised in parliament and 
around it. Political decisions becoming state decisions, thus laws, government decrees, etc., 
constitute the main path for attained results, agreed compromises of political fighting to become 
law. The different logic of law and politics will be at this point transformed by an intermediary 
law politics sphere, which nears them to one another through a series of transformations. This 
way the different logic of the two subsystems, the righteous/unrighteous approach in law, the 
assessment duality of either taking over the government or going into opposition as the logic of 
politics, will remain more or less intact, and politics will, after all, be able to transfer the majority 
priorities of the empirical will of the people into the law, the content of acts. 
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The intermediary law politics sphere between the distinct subsystems of law and politics rests 
partly on the side of the legal subsystem: in the form of lawyer associations and other professional 
organisations, which are no longer forums for elaborating law dogmatic models but forums for 
choosing between them – by paying attention primarily to social consequences and not simply to 
technical aspects of how to avoid contradictions in terms of law dogmatics when choosing 
between various regulatory models de lege ferenda. On the other hand, law politics institutions 
evolve also on the side of the political system as the divisions of the law politicians of each 
political party: law work teams of parliamentary party factions, law departments and events of 
party colleges, e.g., can be referred to in this respect. This dual structure of law politics 
transforms the regulatory models that arise from within the law in two phases, and turns those 
supported by the majority in parliament into statutory orders. The organisation of law politics can 
be identified everywhere where a multiparty system and a parliamentary legislature is in the 
centre of the political system and the legal order. In Western European countries and after the 
political changes in 1989 in Central-Eastern European countries this law politics model represents 
the main path for the connection between law and politics. 
 
It is possible to observe another model for connecting law and politics, which attempts to transfer 
political aims to the realm of the law through court proceedings; this model began to develop in 
the United Sates in the 1960‟s and became a dominant phenomenon for one and a half decade, 
but since the 1970‟s it has been forced back. Owing to American intellectual/political impacts, 
however, this model has appeared, since then, to a certain extent, in some Western European 
countries, in spite of the fact of having been forced back in its mother country; and, especially in 
the new Central European democracies certain jurists show responsiveness to it. 
 
3.1 The evolution of political fighting through litigation 
 
Wherever political democracy and alternative political efforts and interests may be openly 
asserted, on the sites of law determination opposing political forces will most probably appear as 
well. Thus, wherever within the legal system high court precedents play a major part in the 
determination of law, each political group will, understandably, push forward to influence them, 
because such precedents will determine the possibilities of taking action for thousands of 
concerned parties later on as law. How such pushing forward towards judicial decision takes 
place is determined by plenty of structural circumstances. To understand them it is worth 
comparing the two countries applying common law, the UK and the U.S. where judicial precedent 
law traditionally plays an important part, because in these two countries, in spite of having a 
common starting point, political fighting through judicial litigation has developed in strikingly 
different ways. 
 
In the United Kingdom lawyers and especially barristers, authoritative in determining law, and 
the judiciary evolving from them have remained internally homogeneous in terms of politics, 
from first to last, essentially by being rested on the interests of the upper classes interested in the 
maintenance of the status quo. In most of the cases only political parties have been able to attain 
political changes in the existing institutions and prevailing solutions. It has contributed to this 
situation that -after the university training of lawyers the mechanisms of the professional career of 
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barristers/judges select those promoted on the grounds of their commitment to the existing 
institutions. Barristers shall enter the circle of the Queen‟s Counsellors subject to the proposal of 
the Lord Chancellor, and the appointed shall enter high courts from there, but always from the 
row of judges one grade lower, thus the judges who accede to the position of Law Lords go 
through several screenings during a period of long years. This course of the professional career 
prevents lawyers with activist lawyer‟s attitude from playing a part of any importance in the 
determination of the English Law. On the contrary, from 1900 in the United Sates the focal point 
of tertiary level lawyer‟s training was more and more shifted to universities, and by the 1960-70‟s 
owing to the opening of the universities to the widest layers of society lawyers were recruited 
from the entire scale of society. Since then American jurists have consisted of black activists who 
studied Marxism and Leninism, just as well as bellicose feminists, activist lawyers of 
homosexual/lesbian groups, etc., and combative conservative activist lawyers organised as a 
reaction against them. And this internal distribution of political camps have taken roots in 
university departments with staffs of department professors working pursuant to different 
concepts of law; and, in like manner, renowned feminist activists, black civil rights activists and 
combative conservative judges opposing them have been appointed to the judiciary, subject to 
whether the conservative Republicans or the liberal Democrats have given the President of the 
United States and the legal administration. 
 
These two opposing forms of professional organisation of lawyers have given different chances 
for political fighting through litigation to evolve; and, while in the UK this has blocked its way, 
and therefore political forces attempt to attain the changes important for them through 
parliamentary laws instead; in the United Sates the internal groups of lawyers having become 
politically heterogeneous and their spreading to most of jurist professor‟s and judicial positions 
have provided proper precondition for its evolution. 
 
The lawyers split into political camps would, however, not have been able to establish the 
institution of political fighting through litigation themselves. And indeed another development, 
“the rights revolution”, commenced after Earl Warren‟s accession to the Chief Justiceship of the 
Supreme Court in the U.S. in 1953 contributed to its establishment as well. There are records 
from earlier of chief justices deciding cases pursuant to constitutional rights and freedoms instead 
of the provisions of laws, but after the appointment of Justice Warren, step by step, a majority 
evolved who deemed it possible to reshape the society of the United Sates through litigation for 
social changes based on fundamental rights. Numerous political efforts had been unsuccessful in 
getting through the legislation of either Congress or member states because they were supported 
only by minor groups of society, and the majority of society opposed them. It was in this situation 
when Warren became Chief Justice, and once Felix Frankfurter who opposed activist jurisdiction 
had left the forum of justices in 1962, “the rights revolution”, the trend of social changes through 
litigation based on constitutional rights and freedoms, could begin to develop unimpeded. 
 
It was of course also of prime importance that in the 1960‟s the Democrats gave the Presidents of 
the United States, first J.F. Kennedy, later assassinated, then Lyndon Johnson, who in their 
practice of appointing federal court judges promoted with the greatest enthusiasm law professors, 
activist jurists considered to be the advocates of the rights revolution. Federal court judges so 
appointed were more and more ready to approve litigation based on fundamental rights pursuant 
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to the supporting precedents of the Supreme Court, and thus struck down laws passed by 
Congress and member state courts. Lawyers, citizens, following suit, became more and more 
“rights conscious”, and under the stimulus of support by federal courts based their lawsuits more 
and more on fundamental rights, avoiding legal actions based on simple provisions of laws. 
 
This development was overwhelmingly supported by the majority of competent dailies and the 
media, and all this gradually built up a favourable atmosphere for rights service throughout the 
universities and in intelligent circles. (A typically recurring favourite scene of the films made in 
the 1960‟s and 70‟s showed a simple black workingwoman (a cleaning lady or a secretary, etc.) 
engaged in a lawsuit, who looking up at the figure over the entrance of the court and reading the 
words of the Constitution suddenly realised that she had rights and expressing it with simple 
words in the courtroom put verbose lawyers to shame.) Based on favourable media support and 
climate of opinion, in the beginning black civil rights movements, then, in the 1970‟s, feminist 
movements, and finally, in the 1980‟s, homosexual/lesbian movements built up their institutions. 
These three rights movements, which, mostly in association, have been able to dominate 
numerous American universities and cultural institutions since the 1980‟s, have set an example 
for various efforts how to engage in political fighting through litigation. The movements of 
immigrants, environmentalists, the homeless, protectors of animals, etc. have all attempted to 
attain their political aims by applying the litigation strategy thus worked out. 
 
Alongside the formulating of political will based on legislature, parties and parliamentary lobbies, 
all this generated a “secondary political system” in the United Sates from the 1960‟s, which based 
on constitutional rights and freedoms led through judicial litigation. This tendency of 
development, however, began to break more and more since the middle of the 1970‟s, and during 
the term of the Republican presidents (Reagan, Bush) in the 1980‟s was very much forced back, 
but political fighting through litigation continues to maintain considerable positions. 
 
3.2 The legal frameworks of political fighting through litigation 
 
Lawyers split up into camps within the profession can use judicial action for political fighting 
only in the event that some rules of substantive law and the code of procedure are redrafted, or 
reinterpreted, so that instead of/alongside an individual party engaged in a legal action overall 
social groups may appear in the action and litigate in line with abstract and thus politically easily 
flexible fundamental rights, instead of simple provisions of laws. Now that the aspect of 
fundamental rights has been discussed, let us examine the rules of procedural law, which help this 
process. 
 
One of them is the broadening of the legal term “standing”, the right to initiate an action or 
intervene in an action, which gives power both to the party who is directly and personally 
involved in the case and parties who are just loosely concerned. This broadening was made in the 
beginning of the 1960‟s in the United States, and, as it has been referred to above, there were 
judges who were willing to approve any litigant party‟s compliance with the condition of being 
legally concerned by asserting that as a taxpayer any citizen should be concerned in some way in 
any legal case with broader impact. A further process to widen proceedings was the broadening of 
the term „class action‟, as a result of which several thousands of people and the lawyers of their 
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associations could participate in the action: in a damage suit initiated because of the damaging 
effect of a product of a manufacturing company; for example, or, in a class action against an 
authority‟s order. Another form of this was „public interest litigation‟, or in other words “public 
law litigation”, which evolved also in the 1960‟s, the main point of which was that when an 
overall legal issue or fact was in focus in an action, then anyone who were somehow concerned in 
the issue could join the action. Social movement lawyers specialised in political fighting through 
litigation made sure that the lawsuit focused not on simple provisions of law and the restricted 
legal deliberation thereof, but overall rights issues. 
 
Finally, it was an important legal support in the development of political fighting through 
litigation that from the 1960‟s, under pressure of presidential administrations supporting it federal 
laws were passed which allowed the assumption of legal costs by the state if in a rights action the 
plaintiff had won the action; and in such proceedings the postponement of the payment of legal 
costs until the end of the proceedings was permitted. 
 
All these formed the basis, even on the level of procedural law, of the unhindered growth of 
political fighting through litigation in the United Sates. 
 
3.3 The organisation of political fighting through litigation 
 
The organisation basis of political fighting through litigation is constituted by non-profit, “public 
interest” lawyer‟s offices, jurist departments of human rights institutions and various movements, 
associations. The existence of such organisations en masse in a country is a precondition required 
for this kind of litigation to develop to a noticeable level simultaneously with traditional 
litigation. For lack of these, it is vain that the high court judiciary becomes responsive to political 
fighting through litigation, it is vain that through their decisions they attempt to urge certain 
segments of society to attain remarkable changes; mass actions will fail, and without sustained 
effect the entire political fighting through litigation will come to a sudden stop. The supreme 
judicial forum in India, e.g., following the American pattern, commenced a practice of activist 
judgement to shape society at the end of the 1970‟s, but due to aforesaid causes it died out 
without any effect after a while (see Epp 1998:110). 
 
It was not like that in the United States. There the organisation of political fighting through 
litigation began as early as the beginning of 1900, although at that time the judiciary firmly 
resisted the appeal of fundamental rights and their adherence to the law was characterised by a 
rigid, conservative attachment to the words and phrases of legal rules. When quite rarely they 
acted firmly against certain laws in line with fundamental rights, even then they did that in the 
interest of the forces that protected the existing conditions and relations between forces; as in the 
Lochner case, e.g., which became the symbol of conservative activism for decades. In spite of all 
these, ACLU (American Civil Liberties Union) the first great fundamental rights organisation was 
founded in the United Sates as early as the beginning of the 1920‟s followed by NAACP 
(National Association for the Advancement of Colored People) that fought for equality of rights 
for black people and numerous other fundamental rights organisations. Right from the outset the 
most important one of these had always been ACLU, which had been funded since its setting up 
by American financial circles interested in changes, and in the beginning this organisation was the 
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leaven in setting up several similar organisations, both by contributing to their organisation and 
funding them (see Epp 1998:27-49). 
 
Without these organisations it would have been impossible to launch the rights revolution since 
legal costs that cover long, multiphase litigation were far more than the financial means of 
individual litigants. Only the financial support given by ACLU and the other fundamental rights 
organisation established with its help could guarantee that simple litigation was to be extended to 
litigation based on constitutional rights and freedoms. Indispensable was the presence of 
fundamental rights organisations in actions also because with traditional jurist‟s expertise and 
methods there would have been no chance for fundamental rights argumentation marshalling facts 
of moral philosophy, sociology and other branches of science. Only lawyers of organisations 
specialised in these fields were able to elaborate that. 
 
After these beginnings, by the end of the 1930‟s, when by breaking the position of the 
conservative justices who opposed the New Deal the majority of the supreme judicial forum was 
turned gradually towards supporting the „progressive‟ change, the spirit of „Let‟s turn society 
from fundamental rights to progressive direction!‟ slowly began to spread at the peak of federal 
judiciary vis-á-vis the conservative majority in the legislature. This had been almost completed by 
1947 but finally it was Earl Warren‟s appointment in 1953 that accomplished the revolution. The 
readiness of the majority of the justices of the Supreme Court, who turned against the legislature, 
to apply fundamental rights on an activist basis gave a further push to the development of cause 
lawyering organisations, and by the 1980‟s masses of them had been set up (Menkel-Meadow 
1998:31-68). Alongside rights legal aid associations either incorporated into movements or built 
up as ancillary organisations of these, from that time began to take shape the system of non-profit 
public interest lawyer’s offices, which were formally independent lawyer‟s offices just as any 
normal lawyer‟s office but the staff committed to specific causes were – and continue to be – 
actually regarded as activist lawyers, rather than neutral lawyers who worked purely for retaining 
fee. (The latter were called derogatorily „hired gun‟ by activist lawyers contrasted with their 
unselfish, committed legal work.) But because on the grounds of legal regulations made from the 
1960‟s the funding of constitutional rights litigation from public sources commenced and huge 
masses of such actions were initiated, alongside the initial committed lawyers entered neutral 
lawyers working primarily for money; thus, „lawyer technicians‟, who worked essentially for 
retaining fee but continued to maintain a neutral relationship with the case and the client, were 
now distinguished from genuine activist lawyers (see MacCann/Silverstein 1998:261-292). Since 
the 1970‟s in the several hundreds of lawyer‟s offices of this kind five-six thousand social 
movement lawyers have worked, including neutral lawyer technicians, and this number has not 
decreased ever since; although since the 1980‟s because of the federal judiciary having been 
shifted towards textual approach to rules of law the chances of this activity winning lawsuits have 
considerably diminished (Scheingold 1998:118-150). 
 
Litigation based on social movement lawyers (or, as they call themselves „cause lawyers‟) show 
some fundamental differences beside traditional, normal leading of actions by lawyers, and these 
features well indicate that political viewpoints directly enter the realm of procedure through the 
various legal aspects kept separately in traditional lawsuits. Five major differentiating features 
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can be discerned in the legal actions of social movement lawyers compared to traditional lawsuits 
(see a summary on this in Trubek/Kransberger 1998:202-205). 
 
1. ‘Humanising the action’, which means the attempt to confront argumentation confined to 
traditional legal aspects and the constraint to mould the case into legal categories; and the 
statement of the facts of the case with as exhaustive sociological data as possible. This kind of 
action has a great advantage in the American type litigation which is based on an extensive 
involvement of lay jurors with jurors present, in addition to criminal cases, both in civil 
actions and lawsuits that fall under other branches of law; and where the advocates of rights 
activism permanently require that the function of the jurors be augmented. Instead of 
reduction to legal aspects a wide-ranging statement of facts with emotional, moral, political 
overtones, addressed as much to the jury as the professional judge – this is what makes an 
action „humane‟. 
2. ‘Politicising actions’, which means that instead of legal arguments and concepts that are 
traditional and politically mostly neutral (or, as phrased by social movement lawyers: that 
apply more concealed political considerations) overtly feminist, antiracist movement, etc. 
legal arguments are used subject to which particular sector of social movements the political 
fighting through litigation concerned falls under. It should be noted here that the university 
sections of American social movement lawyers, who have been able to establish themselves 
since the 1970‟s and 80‟s at law schools of universities, have consciously attempted to work 
out modifications of concepts and out of them systems of concepts under various branches of 
law which represent overtly feminist, racial (protective towards black or coloured people) or 
homosexual/lesbian legal constructions. And social movement lawyers use these in actions, 
preferably avoiding traditional law dogmatics concepts. Because these are, they believe, 
antifeminist, racist and heterosexually biased. 
3. ‘Making actions collective’, which means that alongside the individual litigant as many 
number of other parties in similar situation are to be involved as possible. As it has been 
indicated, since the 1960‟s this has been made possible by joining public interest actions, 
class actions and by filling the federal judiciary in these years with judges who are responsive 
in this respect. 
4. ‘Making actions media events’, which means that in the procedure of the action alongside the 
aim of winning the suit appears the aim of presenting the case (and the „cause of movement‟) 
in the mass media. What is more, the broadest possible presence in the media through 
litigation constitutes an impact which outdoes the benefit of winning of the action, because 
the „cause‟ becomes known to the general public, multitudes of sympathizers might be won, 
and the initiation of similar lawsuits in other parts of the country pursuant to the pattern 
presented in the media might be urged. Therefore, social movement lawyers often acquiesce 
in losing the action when the circumstances of the lawsuit make huge presence in the media 
probable. This may, however, be in conflict with the aim of attaining an important precedent, 
which is one of the essential goals of social movement lawyers in rights actions (strategic 
litigation), and this urges them to refrain from litigation doomed to be lost. And, indeed, 
materials on „cause lawyering‟ notice that quite often raging battles are fought between non-
lawyer activists who prefer presence in the media at any cost and activist lawyers of 
movements who keep strategic legal aims much more in view (MacCann/Silverstein 
1998:263-274). 
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5. ‘Emotionalising the action’, which means that the litigant, often multitudes of parties, and the 
lawyer share emotional grounds. Social movement lawyers, cause lawyers are not simply 
„hired guns‟ in the hand of the litigant who are ready to put into action their brilliant legal 
technique on behalf of any client for a proper fee, but „associates sharing ideas and principles‟ 
who live for the „cause‟ very much like their clients represented by them. This, however, often 
gives rise to the conflict that the client, with a view to concentrating on his or her own 
particular interests, might be inclined to come to an agreement and in general attempts to 
focus on his or her own specific case, while committed „cause lawyers‟ fight for the overall 
cause. This tension can be eased by involving in the action as many clients as possible, 
because that way the all-embracing nature becomes manifest and the social movement lawyer 
concentrating on such all-embracing cause can act rather free from the requirements of the 
individual litigant. 
 
All these features can develop in a powerful form if the costs of constitutional rights lawsuit are 
undertaken by the state, and in this event social movement lawyers will search for the client 
indispensable for the action purely as a justification; they may even pay, under some pretext, the 
person formally involved as plaintiff so that they could initiate the lawsuit based on the client. In 
this event, because the client is not to bear any costs, social movement lawyers can freely shape 
the action in line with the above-described features. That is why it means the greatest danger for 
political fighting trough litigation when public funding of constitutional rights litigation is 
curtailed either by federal or member state legislature; and this has occurred several times in the 
United Sates in recent decades; to say nothing of the endless number of bills lying submitted to 
federal and member state legislatures. 
 
After the descriptive presentation let us now briefly look at the track along which law and politics 
are connected in terms of assessment. While the law politics sphere organised around the 
parliament is based on keeping the logic of the two subsystems sound, and brings over regulatory 
propositions from the law dogmatic sphere through double transformation without damaging the 
closed construction of law, political fighting through litigation takes political fighting and its 
viewpoints directly into the courtroom. Furthermore, as a precondition of that it politicises law 
departments of universities, and creates there overtly political law theories, legal constructions 
that overtly assume political viewpoints. Political fighting through litigation thus evades 
legislature and using abstract constitutional rights and freedoms as weapons turns straight 
towards the courtroom, and with social movement lawyers, university activist law professors or 
courtroom cause lawyers, realises its goal directly inside law, preferably with huge presence in 
the media, broadcast live to public opinion. 
 
3.4 The appearance of signs of political fighting through litigation in Hungary 
 
The legal culture and the organisation of lawyers in Europe do not favour the evolution of 
political fighting through litigation in Hungary as it has not been the case in other European 
countries either. In Hungary the organisation of politics takes place rather steadily around the 
parliamentary field, and the departments of university law faculties are mostly attached to the 
politically neutral set of traditional law dogmatics constructions. Here the deep-seated attitude of 
lawyer‟s ethic represents adherence to dry/elegant argumentation in courtrooms, and the 
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obligation to exclude direct political overtones. Therefore, political fighting through litigation has 
not been able to get a foothold even in the countries where constitutional jurisdiction has evolved. 
(In the beginning, from the end of the 1940‟s, this referred to Germany, Italy and Austria; then 
from the end of the 1970‟s Greece, Portugal and Spain followed suit; and after the political 
changes in 1989 most of the Central-Eastern European countries have also introduced this 
institution.) Germany has gone the farthest towards it by acknowledging the effect of fundamental 
rights in the interpretation of laws, but this legal possibility has not developed into political 
fighting through litigation, to the contrary, the inclusion of fundamental rights into the 
interpretation of the provisions of law made them „embedded in legalese‟. That is, it has been 
more typical that fundamental rights have been supplied with dogmatics and thus „tamed‟ than 
fundamental rights have politicised judicial courtrooms. 
 
After these antecedents it seems surprising that in spite of the fact that the existence of 
constitutional rights and constitutional jurisdiction in Hungary, as an institution created after the 
political changes in 1989, goes back only for ten years, but minor lawyer‟s circles have already 
set out to exploit the possibilities of political fighting through litigation. Looking at the sources of 
financing and intellectual motivations, these developments arise directly from the social groups 
interested in American political fighting through litigation, and they are actually the 
transplantation of institutions and solutions tested for decades into Hungary. Their basis is 
represented by the Central European University, the Fudamentum Human Rights and 
Documentation Centre and some social movement lawyers of various legal aid organisations and 
movements of various ethnical groups basically built up on the financial basis of the American 
Soros Foundation. Let us look at what chances they have for introducing the practice of American 
political fighting through litigation in our country. 
 
What increase their chances are factors primarily outside law. Very strong support from the media 
creates the advantage which this little group enjoys, and the extremely centralised operation of the 
media in the capital city shaping public opinion of the entire country as well as personal ties 
between executives of the press, the radio and television makes this advantage very serious. 
Political fighting through litigation rests on the media, as it has been the case in the United Sates 
described above where „the rights revolution‟ has been slowly attained also through the media 
since the 1920‟s. 
 
Factors inside the law, however, do not favour this law politics strategy. The internal courses of 
judicial career separated from politics in 1997, and the appointment of judges and their promotion 
in the hierarchy of the profession is not possible unless in adherence to the patterns accepted by 
the entirety of the judiciary. This course of the career gives not much chance for activist lawyers 
breaking away from the European legal culture with a tradition of several hundred years – we can 
state our hypothesis; and, at this point, reference can be made to the effects arising from the 
patterns of the English judicial career which also hinder the spreading of activist lawyers for the 
same reasons. 
 
A further obstacle in the way of the spreading of social movement lawyers is the fact that current 
Hungarian activist lawyers are almost exclusively university jurists, or legal experts at some 
organisation, but they may not act as lawyers. The few lawyers who quite frequently use human 
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rights motives in their argumentation, either for defence against the abuses in the phase of police 
investigation in criminal cases, or when threatening to apply to Strasbourg after having lost a case 
at home, are broadening the range of traditional tricks of lawyering rather than actually acting as 
social movement lawyers. 
 
Among university jurists, however, a climate of sympathizing with social movement lawyering is 
more intensely present but it is probably based on the fact that they are not fully aware of the 
effect exerted by social movement lawyering and political fighting through litigation on the 
material of specific branches of law – and specific law departments! The positive attitude means 
much rather that “After all, constitutional rights represent a highly noble aim!” And, this, looking 
at it in itself, is true. 
 
As a conclusion, it should be noted that in the United States the euphoria of the 1960‟s and 70‟s, 
once the effect of political fighting through litigation endangering the legal system had been 
experienced, was followed by a vehement reversal, and by now political fighting through 
litigation has become just a shadow of what it used to be. Information regarding this was totally 
lacking when after 1989 we began to introduce constitutional jurisdiction as a counterpole of 
dictatorship, and public opinion often regarded the taking of constitutional rights further to the 
courtroom of normal forums of justice as the augmentation of democracy. This article can be 
nothing else but a brief introduction to throwing off one-sidedness. 
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